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Abstract Available statistics reveal little about the economic consequences of the
increasing global dispersion of production processes. To investigate the issue, we perform
grass-roots investigative work to uncover the geography of the value added for a Nokia N95
smartphone circa 2007. The phone was assembled in Finland and China. When the device
was assembled and sold in Europe, the value-added share of Europe (EU-27) rose to 68%.
Even when it was assembled in China and sold in the United States, Europe captured as
much as 51% of the value added, despite of the fact that it played little role in supplying the
physical components. Our analysis illustrates that international trade statistics can be
misleading; the capture of value added is largely detached from the flow of physical goods.
Instead, services and other intangible aspects of the supply chain dominate. While final
assembly—commanding 2% of the value added in our case—has increasingly moved
offshore, the developed countries continue to capture most of the value added generated by
global supply chains.
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In high-income countries, decision-makers and experts alike express their concern
regarding production moving to lower-cost locations. Our illustration in this paper suggests
that commonly employed measures exaggerate the issue to the extent that some aspects
may even be illusory.
We agree with the theoretical argument of Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008, p.
1978) that “Revolutionary advances in transportation and communications technology have
weakened the link between labor specialization and geographic concentration, making it
increasingly viable to separate tasks in time and space… The result has been a boom in
“offshoring” of both manufacturing tasks and other business functions.” We demonstrate,
however, that value capture—the ultimate variable of interest for both businesses and
countries—is considerably less dispersed than tasks within a supply chain.
Due to limitations regarding the available statistics, we resorted to grass-roots
investigative work to uncover the geography of value added for the Nokia N95 smartphone
circa 2007. We find that value capture is increasingly detached from the flows of physical
intermediate and final goods. Instead, in-house and market services and various forms of
intangible assets command the lion’s share of value added (and thus income and profits
earned). Even if final assembly has largely moved offshore, the developed countries
continue to capture most of the value added generated globally: even for a “made in China”
smartphone exported for sale in the US, we find that Europe (EU-27) still captures half of
the value added.
Linden et al. (2009), who study the supply chain of Apple’s iPod digital music player in
2005, is the most relevant predecessor of our work. They conclude that even though the
iPod was assembled in Asia, Apple’s American workers and shareholders predominantly
reaped the benefits. They also emphasize that innovation matters; the greatest value tends is
owned by companies and locations providing critical differentiated inputs. Finally, they
highlight the fact that international trade statistics can mislead as much as inform. All of
these findings are echoed in our work.
Our approach and method closely resemble those of Linden et al. (2009). Besides
obvious differences in terms of the industry, product, and point in time, our analysis is more
detailed in several regards. Furthermore, our analysis focuses on value added (rather than
gross margin). Our most important extension concerns the geographical breakdown of value
added: we go beyond headquarters locations and allow for the generation of each
component’s value added in multiple locations and functions. To our knowledge, this is the
first paper to examine global supply chains with regard to value added in such detail.
2 Context
The telecommunications industry typically consists of the following: network infrastructure
equipment and its operation, end-user access (terminals, handsets, and portals), and digital
content and services. Since the early 1990’s, there has been a convergence of the
telecommunications industry with closely related industries, particularly information
technology (computers and their data networks, including the Internet) and content
provision of various types, particularly radio, TV, and recorded audio and video.
Our case study of the Nokia N95 smartphone addresses one aspect of the tele-
communications industry; the primary function of a phone is to provide a physical end-user
access point to wireless voice and data networks and their services. As the phone in
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question was introduced at a time when the convergence mentioned above had progressed
substantially, it embeds dozens of non-communication functionalities.
Advances in information and communication technology (ICT) have had an important
enabling role in the geographic dispersion of production processes. Furthermore, ICT
industries are themselves among the most dispersed major industries globally, which relate
to the exceptional modularity of basic designs, especially for personal computers. While the
industry’s internal division of labor and geographic dispersion has not progressed as far for
mobile phones as it has for PCs, it should be noted that our case considers an industry that
has progressed further in geographic dispersion than many others.
Upon its announcement in 26 September 2006, the N95 was Nokia’s flagship product. It
was one of the first “all-in-one multimedia computers” having the size and weight of a
standard phone. The N95 supported the latest high-speed mobile telephone protocols; it was
also equipped with WiFi for long-range and Bluetooth for short-range data communications.
It integrated GPS navigation, an MP3 player, an FM radio, and two video/still cameras, and
it supported multiple email, messaging, and internet protocols. With its cameras, color
display, and multiple speakers, the N95 recorded and played back audio, video, and images
with ease. Preinstalled software included a calculator, a calendar, and a dictionary, and—as
with any computer—further software could be installed. The phone was actively marketed
as an access point to the Internet services of Yahoo!, Amazon, and Flickr. The
aforementioned convergence in industries would have been complete, if only the phone
had supported the viewing of over-the-air television broadcasts. This omission was not,
however, attributable to Nokia, but was rather related to the (still) lacking standards and
unresolved intellectual property rights issues. Commercially, the N95 was a success: some
ten million, highly profitable copies were sold worldwide.
3 Sources
Our analysis is based on five sources. First, in August 2008, with the help of two
engineering experts, we physically took apart a fully-functioning N95 and examined each of
its approximately 600 individual components. Second, we accessed public (particularly
Internet searches) and private (direct contacts with various companies and individuals
across the supply chain) information to obtain an idea of the direct (primarily coding for
software and manufacturing/assembly for hardware) and indirect (R&D, design, and
various supporting functions) value added of each component. Third, we purchased a
standard “teardown” report of the component composition of the N95 (Portelligent 2007),
which also included estimates of factory prices and vendors by component.1 Fourth, armed
with the knowledge gathered in the previous steps, we collected further qualitative and
quantitative information (and confirmed the validity of the rest of the data) via interviews
with sixteen industry experts working currently or previously in various roles in the mobile
handset supply chain.2 Fifth, we examined financial reports and press releases of the
companies involved and those of their direct competitors. We particularly exploited the
1 The teardown report of Portelligent was acquired in September, 2008. We have also reviewed teardowns of
other companies such as iSuppli.
2 Due to the sensitivity of the topic, we had to assure full anonymity of our interviewees. The interviews
were conducted between January 2009 and March 2010 and were semi-structured with questions that varied
between interviewees depending on their position in the supply chain.
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differences in reporting in various geographies and officially required further information,
such as 20-F reports in the United States.
4 The supply chain
In our terminology, a supply chain refers to the global flows of intermediate goods and
services (both those provided in-house and those purchased from outside vendors) involved
in providing goods and services for final consumption. In each step, the vendor employs
inputs, conducts its own value adding activities, and transfers its output to the other
participants in the supply chain. The sum of all value adding activities equals the final retail
price of the phone (before any applicable taxes are added).
Figure 1 represents a stylized supply chain for the Nokia N95. In the case of tangible
components, typically four to eight layers exist between the assembly and the extraction of
metals and minerals from the earth’s crust (Nokia 2009). All components embed intangible
assets in some form and conform to one or more industry standards. In the case of licensed
or purchased embedded and standalone software, the flows cannot be readily mapped in a
similar manner, but typically, fewer intermediate layers exist.
In Fig. 1, the actors in the supply chain of the N95 are categorized into five groups:
mines and refiners, component vendors and sub-assemblers, software and technology
providers and licensors, final assembly by Nokia,3 and wholesale and retail distribution by
telecommunication network operators and/or general traders.
The flow in Fig. 1 is as follows. The still raw but now purified outputs of miners/refiners
are turned to sheets of metal and other elementary processed goods that are traded to parts
and components vendors. These vendors in turn deliver to sub-assemblers (which may in
turn deliver to other sub-assemblers) feeding the final assembler. Some of the intangibles, to
the extent that they are not embedded in and bundled with physical components, are
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Fig. 1 A stylized supply chain of the Nokia N95
3 Unlike some of its competitors, Nokia maintains significant in-house manufacturing and assembly capacity;
in 2007, Nokia outsourced 20% of the total assembly of its phones (SEC 2007, p. 36). All final assembly of
the N95 was done by Nokia itself.
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licensed in a “pooled” form as parts of industry standards. Standalone software is acquired
as necessary. Depending on the market, Nokia’s direct customers are typically distributors
(who in turn supply wholesalers and retailers) or operators. In both cases, the cooperation
and support of the operators is vitally important in reaching the end-user.
5 Value added by actor
Let us first consider the direct components, parts, sub-assemblies, software, and licenses of
the N95 (the bill-of-materials). We first consider the actual sales prices (the gross value)4;
but in later sections, we consider the first-tier suppliers on a value-added basis.
As shown in Table 1, the direct bill-of-materials amounts to approximately €200. It
should be noted, however, that Nokia is a major holder of intellectual property rights (IPRs)
regarding GSM/WCDMA cellular communication standards, and it does not pay licensing
fees to itself. Furthermore, cross-licensing is quite common within the industry, in which
case fees paid do not reflect the full value of the employed IPRs. For a company without its
own employable/tradable IPRs, licensing fees could, in our view, be more than double those
presented in Table 1.5 Apart from licensing fees, the most costly components of the phone
are the processors, other integrated circuits, and the large color display.
The main integrated circuits of the N95 were provided by Nokia’s long-time ally Texas
Instruments (US). The display and the most expensive memory chips were obtained from
Samsung (South Korea). On the semiconductor side, the main European companies
involved were NXP Semiconductor (the Netherlands), STMicroelectronics (Switzerland),
and Cambridge Silicon Radio (the UK).
As shown in Table 1, the licensing fee for the Symbian operating system was
approximately €3. According to Nokia, the company paid less than 3% aggregate license
fees on its WCDMA handset sales (based on Nokia’s 12 April 2007 press release). On the
basis of our interviews, we use 2.9% of Nokia’s €467 factory price of the N95, i.e., €13.5.
Besides Nokia, Qualcomm (US), Motorola (US), and Ericsson (Sweden) are among the
major WCDMA IPR holders. In addition to the operating system and the telecommuni-
cation air interface, Nokia paid fees for, e.g., the inclusion of Adobe Acrobat Reader,
RealPlayer, and Zip Manager. We estimate that in total, this software was responsible for
0.9% of Nokia’s sales price, i.e., €4.2. The total cost of separately licensed intangibles and
software was €21.
The approximately €200 listed in the bill-of-materials accounts for the purchases of
Nokia from upstream vendors as inputs for the final assembly of the N95. It reflects the total
value added of all the first-tier vendors and their suppliers (the second- and subsequent-tier
vendors). Below, we analyze the value added by Nokia and the distribution channel.
4 Throughout the paper, we refer to the unbundled and unsubsidized official retail price without including
any applicable taxes and excluding any additional products and services purchased. Mobile phones’ sales
margins vary considerably and are difficult to estimate in many markets due to various types of tie-ins with
subscriptions and other services.
5 The Economist (28 Apr. 2007, p. 8) notes that “ABI research estimates that just four firms own almost 60%
of the patents in 3G technology, pushing licensing rates as high as 28.5% of the cost of equipment.” In this
quote, it is somewhat unclear what is included in the licensing fees and what is the denominator, but even a
conservative interpretation of this quote would suggest that, for an a priori industry outsider, licensing fees
might have been manifold as compared to those listed in Table 1. In our view, the figure suggested in the
Economist is somewhat exaggerated.
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For each company in the supply chain of the N95, we derived the ratio of value added to
net sales or the value added margin at the firm level. For the most part, we then equated this
with the component-level value added margin.6
For the distributors, wholesalers, and retailers, the value added margin and the sales
margin are almost identical. Retailers’ sales margins on high-end mobile phones are
somewhat lower than is usual in the electronics sector, 10–12% of the final sale price,
leading to an estimated value added of €60.1 by the retailer. The distributors’/wholesalers’
margins are 3.3–4.5%, suggesting an estimated value added of €19.1.
Subtracting all downstream costs from the price Nokia sells the phone to the distribution
channel yields its own value added, €269. This value added is allocated to direct and
indirect in-house labor costs (e.g., in its manufacturing/assembly, innovation, advertising,
design, marketing, financial, legal, and management functions), depreciation of tangible
and intangible assets, investments, and operating profit. It also includes some aspects of
outsourcing, which we were unable to separate from Nokia’s internal functions: purchases
of “billable hours”, some R&D and software sub-contracting, outbound logistics, and
certain externally provided warranty and other services.
6 A company’s value added is equal to the sum of its operating profit, depreciation, and labor costs. For the
few companies that conform only to US GAAP accounting principles, labor costs are unavailable. For these
firms, we assume the margins to be the same as for their nearest competitors. Thus, for example, in the case
of the charger included in the sales package of the N95: the factory price of the charger is €1.1, and it is
supplied by Astec (US), which is a part of the Emerson Network Power group using US GAAP. Its direct
competitor Salcomp Oy (Finland)—globally the leading mobile phones’ charger vendor—follows IFRS. In
its 2007 financial statement, Salcomp’s value added margin was 23.3%. Thus, we estimate Astec’s value
added to be approximately €0.3. Similarly, in the case of Texas Instruments (US), we employ the average of
the value added margins of the three competitors it identified in its 2007 Form 10-K report (pp. 3–4) required
by the US Securities and Exchange Commission, i.e., NXP (the Netherlands), Infineon Technologies AG
(Germany) and STMicroelectronics (Switzerland).




Main camera module (5 million pixels) 16.5 8.3%
Memories 14.5 7.3%
Battery pack 3.0 1.5%
Video conference camera (VGA) 1.2 0.6%
Other integrated circuits (excl. processors and memories) 31.5 15.9%
Mechanics 18.7 9.4%
All other hardware inputs 21.1 10.6%
BOM (excl. supporting material, license fees and final assembly) 162.4 81.8%
Supporting material 15.5 7.8%
BOM (excl. license fees and final assembly) 177.9 89.6%
GSM/WCDMA license fees 13.5 6.8%
Symbian operating system 3.0 1.5%
Other license fees 4.2 2.1%
BOM (excluding final assembly) 198.6 100.0%
Source: ETLA
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Careful studies of industry sources and our interviews suggest that the final assembly/
manufacturing cost of the N95 is €11.5, i.e., 2% of the pre-tax final sales price.7 Thus, even
if the final assembly is the essential part of the supply chain that meets the eyes of laymen
(not least because of the “Made in …” labeling found on manufactured goods), the value
added it commands is quite low.
Table 2 presents a value-added breakdown of the N95’s pre-tax retail price of €546:
Nokia captures 50% of the value, first-tier hardware vendors 11%, first-tier (external, non-
cross-licensed) software/intangible vendors 3%, second- and higher-tier vendors (vendors-
of-vendors) 19%, distribution/wholesale 3.5%, and retail 11%.
6 Value added by location
Table 2 provides a global breakdown of value added by the actors’ major categories.
Because the gross domestic product can be measured as the sum of the values added
by all activities in a given country, national interest is based on where the value
capture takes place.8 Determining this is somewhat difficult, as companies are reluctant
to reveal the geography of their operations even at the firm level (let alone at the level of
a specific commercial offering). With some detective work, we can nevertheless make
reasonably accurate estimates, at least as far as broader geographical regions are
concerned.
The value capture of in-house indirect inputs, such as the role of general management
and brand, and re-usable tangible and intangible assets (such as designs copied from
previous or contributing to future models) are particularly tricky to allocate per phone and
especially across geographies. Furthermore, we do not observe all actors and functions
involved. Thus, In Table 3 we consider five alternatives in constructing the geographical
breakdown:
– Our baseline method, in Column A, allocates the value added to the headquarters
location of each participant in the supply chain. This tends to over-estimate the role of
developed countries and regions.
– Our second method, in Column B (see Eq. 4 in Appendix 1), assigns the value capture
solely on the basis of the locations of the production factors (physical capital, labor,
and R&D). This does, for instance, implicitly assume that the general management or
corporate brand has no specific role in the value capture tending to under-estimate the
role of developed countries and regions.
– The third alternative, in Column C, is an intermediate method between A and B: it is
assumed that, in the case of each participant, 10% of the value capture takes place at
the headquarters location and 90% is based on to the actual location(s) of the
participant’s factors of production.
– Individuals and organizations in various locations have different productivities. Thus,
their ability to capture value may vary. Column D replicates Column B, with the
exception that it attempts to correct for this fact using multifactor productivity
differences between regions (see Eq. 6 in Appendix 1).
7 In addition to direct labor costs, our estimate includes factory management and other indirect labor and
capital costs.
8 Obviously employment is also of considerable national interest. We do not consider employment effects in
this paper.
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– Our preferred estimation method (Column E) combines Columns C and D. Thus, in the
case of each participant, 10% of the productivity-adjusted value capture occurs at the
headquarters location and 90% at the actual location of the production factors.
In a sense, A and B constitute the lower and upper bounds for Europe, C and D
refine certain aspects, and E provides our preferred estimate of the geography of the
value capture.
It should be noted that the first five rows in Table 3 (Finland …Other countries) do
not fully reflect the value captured by each location simply because the next four rows
(Other countries … The country of final assembly) have not been allocated accordingly.
While we have a sense of the geography of vendors-of-vendors and we can make
educated guesses regarding the inputs they provide, we cannot discriminate between
unrecognized vendors (Unaccounted inputs), as the level of detail in our data is not
comparable to our understanding of Nokia and its first-tier suppliers. With these caveats,
we adopt our “rock-bottom” estimate E from Table 3 and split the value added of the
unaccounted inputs and vendors-of-vendors to geographies with the assumptions
discussed below (see also the notes to Table 3).
The geographical allocations of the country of final sales and final assembly depend
on the specific case. For instance, for an N95 assembled in Finland (Salo) for the
German market, an extra 2.1% would go to Finland and an extra 14.5% to Germany
(Other EU-27); for an N95 assembled in China (Beijing) for final sale in the United
States, the outcome would be different. We considered how the two cases (from Finland
to Germany and from China to the United States) are recorded in international goods trade
statistics on the basis of gross value, and how the value added on a geographical basis
differs from that (Tables 4 and 5).9
6.1 Further considerations
Our best estimate is that over the life cycle of the N95, 55% of the value added was
captured by EU-27 countries, taking into account both assembly locations and all countries
of final sale (Table 5, bottom). Even when the final assembly occurred in China and the
9 In 2007, the basic principle applied by Nokia was that smartphones intended for the European market were
assembled in Europe, and smartphones intended for the Asian market were assembled in Asia. To our
knowledge, smartphones intended for the US market were mainly assembled in Asia. Thus, using these three
principles as our guidelines, the potential combinations are as follows: assembled in EU and sold in EU;
assembled in EU and sold in other countries; assembled in Asia and sold in Asia; assembled in Asia and sold
in North America; and assembled in Asia and sold in other countries. As a robustness check (Appendix 2),
we changed the assumptions and re-calculated the geographical allocations.
Suppliers of material inputs 11%





Vendors of vendors 19%
Table 2 The value added break-
down of the Nokia N95 listed by
supply chain participant,%
Source: ETLA
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final sales occurred in the United States, EU-27 countries captured 51% of the value added
(Table 5, middle), despite the fact that the phone was Made in China.
How is it possible that EU-27 countries capture so much of the value based on such an
apparently minor role? This occurs simply because Finland and other EU-27 countries were
dominant in the branding, development, design, and management.
Table 6 summarizes some of the above findings. While the final assembly is the main
step in the physical incarnation of the product, this stage only commands 2% of the overall
value added. However, the distribution channel, and its ultimate retail loop in particular,
captures a large share of the value added—many times more than the final assembly.
We referred above to international goods trade statistics and ignored service trade
statistics. On the basis of the supply chain’s geography and the assembly volume of the N95
in Nokia’s Beijing plant, we estimate that service exports from Finland to China in 2007
were approximately €0.8 billion with respect to the N95. As recorded by Statistics Finland,
however, the total service trade across all industries from Finland to China was €0.6 billion
in 2007. Thus, the recorded overall figure does not account even for this one phone model,
which in 2007 accounted for less than 1.5% of all sold Nokia phones and less than 7.5% of
all Nokia phone sales.10
In the above calculations, we assigned Nokia’s operating profits to the headquarters
location, which is consistent with prevailing national accounts practices. It does not suggest
that Finns would “own” this part of the value added beyond their ownership of the
company. Indeed, more than 90% of Nokia’s stock is held abroad and profits earned belong
ultimately to the shareholders, in this case primarily to US-based institutions. Any
dividends paid to foreigners are appropriately recorded in cross-border financial flows. It
turns out, however, that companies’ purchases of their own shares are not appropriately
recorded, which in the case of Finland inflates its current account surplus. Savolainen and
Forsman (2010) note that Nokia’s purchases of its own shares amounted to €18.6 billion in
2003–2008. In 2005, they amounted to 2.3% of Finnish GDP.
Although our N95 analysis is a single case study, it is, based on our understanding, a
typical case in the electronics industry. Furthermore, automobiles, textiles, and some other
traditional industries do not appear very different. Even in industries that feature less
geographical dispersion, dispersion is nevertheless increasing. In our opinion, broader
conclusions can be legitimately drawn from our analysis.
7 Conclusions
Even though the location of the final assembly earns the “made in …” label, the labeled
country may command only a few percent of the supply chain’s overall value added of an






Assembly in Finland, final sale in
Germany
€467
Assembly in China, final sale in the US €467
10 For a more general discussion on the globalization of trade in services, see Lejour and Smith (2008).
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advanced industrial good. Unlike the apparent conclusions drawn from the cross-border
flows of the related physical components and goods, developed countries continue to
capture the lion’s share of value added generated globally. Even for manufactured goods,
most of the value added is captured by services (both in-house and those purchased from
external vendors) and various forms of intangibles (including returns earned on various
forms of intellectual property).
Our analysis has several broader implications. First, it highlights the irrelevance of the
lingering manufacturing vs. services discussion. The recorded value added by manufacturing
Table 6 Breakdown of the phone’s €546 (+tax) retail price circa 2007
Physical components €178 33%
Processors €34 6%
Other integrated circuits €32 6%
Memories €15 3%
Display €22 4%
Main camera (5 mill. pixels) €17 3%
Other physical components €59 11%
Licenses and software €21 4%
Nokia’s value added €269 49%
Internal support functions €169 31%
Operating profit €89 16%
Final assembly €11 2%




The phone’s €546 retail price is the unbundled and unsubsidized official retail price without the inclusion of
any applicable taxes; it also excludes other products and services possibly purchased at the time of initial sale
or later. Licenses include protocols, the operating system, pre-installed software etc. Nokia is a major
intellectual property (IP) holder in this domain and does not pay fees to itself. Thus, the value of its own IP is
not included here. Furthermore, non-monetary payments (e.g., cross-licensing) are not included here. For a
firm without its own IP, licensing fees could be manifold; see the text for discussion. In addition to operating
profit and the final assembly, Nokia’s value added covers its innovation, advertising, design, marketing, legal,
and management costs, as well as depreciation and investments. It also includes some aspects of outsourcing
we were unable to separate from Nokia’s internal functions: purchases of “billable hours”, some R&D and
software sub-contracting, outbound logistics, and certain external warranty & other services. Nokia’s
operating profit has been estimated on the basis of the overall operating profits of Nokia Multimedia in 2006
and 2007 by assuming that the profitability of the N95 was typical of a phone
Table 5 The geography of valued added in the two cases discussed in Table 4 and over the product’s life
cycle (accounting for both assembly locations and all final sales markets)
Finland Other EU-27
countries
Asia North-America Rest of the
world
Assembly in Finland, final sale in Germany 41% 27% 13% 14% 5%
Assembly in China, final sale in the US 39% 12% 16% 28% 5%
Both assembly locations, all markets 38% 16% 18% 17% 11%
Source: ETLA
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has a significant service component; most services need supporting physical infrastructure and
complementing goods. The distinction between manufacturing and services is immaterial and
should perhaps be laid to rest completely. Second, international commodity trade statistics that
continue to record the gross values of cross-border goods flows can be highly misleading in
economic analysis. Indeed, internationally concerted efforts should be taken to develop value
added based trade statistics. While complementing the goods with service trade statistics and
balance of payments information should help in principle, this does not currently appear to be
the case in practice. Our crude estimates in the previous section suggest that service trade
statistics and balance of payments information might be equally misleading, albeit for different
reasons. Third, in many countries, national policy makers appear to have an obsession with
having a certain national capacity of final assembly. This can hardly be justified by its role in
national value added. This is not to say that final assembly has no importance, just that its
national importance may relate more to its links with other functions in the supply chain.
Ultimately, nations compete for their citizens’ high value adding roles in globally dispersed
supply chains. For a given level of effort, the national objective is then to capture as much value
and generate as much national wealth as possible. While China is determined not to remain a
“2%” assembly location and is rapidly extending its higher value adding functions, Europe
and the United States retain many advantages in providing globally differentiating inputs.
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Appendix 1
To estimate the geographical breakdown of the value of the N95, we proceed as follows: The total






Y The total value of the N95
Yc The value added of part c of the supply chain.
The value added of each part (Yc) can be created globally. We assume that this total
value added of each part is created in an area covering the home country (Finland), other
European countries, North America and Asia, thus
Yc ¼ Yc;D þ Yc;E þ Yc;N þ Yc;A þ Yc;O; ð2Þ
where
D Domestic (Finland)
E Europe (Other EU-27 countries)




Our data includes the value added of each part (Yc), but information regarding how this
value added is created in different areas is not available. To estimate the value added of part
c created in each region (Yc,D,Yc,E,Yc,N,Yc,A,Yc,O), we proceed as follows:
We assume that the value added of part c captured in each region is created through
factors of production. As is usual in the economic literature, we consider three factors of
production: physical capital stock (C), the size of the labor force (L) and knowledge capital
stock (K). We assume that the effect of each production factor is the same as that of their
elasticities of output. The previous empirical literature (including a number of studies) has
estimated a Cobb-Douglas type of production function:
Q ¼ ACaLbKg ; ð3Þ
where A is the multiplicative technology parameter.
Equation 3 is typically estimated in logarithm form. Thus, the parameters α, β, and γ are
the elasticities of output (Q) with respect to physical capital stock, labor and knowledge,
respectively. In the majority of empirical studies, the estimated production function has
included only two factors of production: physical capital and labor. Usually, the results of
empirical studies show that the physical capital elasticity is approximately 0.4 and the labor
elasticity is approximately 0.6.
In studies, where knowledge capital is approximated using R&D stock, the estimated
knowledge capital elasticity typically varies between 0.05 and 0.25 (Hall 1993; Mairesse and
Hall 1994; Harhoff 1998; Capron and Cincera 1998). In our calculations, based on these
studies, we assume that this elasticity is 0.15. However, most studies have not takes the
double counting related to R&D into account. R&D investment also consists of investment in
physical capital and labor, and these components are included in the regular production
factors (Schankerman 1981; Hall and Mairesse 1996). Based on earlier literature, we know
that approximately 50% of R&D expenditures are labor costs (Hall 2009). Considering this,
we modify the capital elasticity (0.6) and labor elasticity (0.4) as follows:
ba ¼ a  0:5g
bb ¼ b  0:5g
Thus, our our corrected elasticities for capital, labor and R&D are 0.325, 0.525 and 0.15,
respectively. We use these elasticities as the multipliers of the production factors.
We continue by calculating what share of each production factor is located in each region R
and then multiply each share by the elasticity of output. We then sum these values by region
and obtain each region’s share of value added (related to part c). Finally, we multiply this
share by the value added of part c (Yc). The value added of part c created in region R, is
calculated as follows:




Cr is the firm’s physical capital stock in region R
C is the sum of the firm’s physical capital in all regions
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LR is the firm’s employment in region R
L is the sum of the firm’s employment in all regions
KR is the firm’s knowledge capital in region R
K is the sum of the firm’s knowledge capital in all regions,
Thus, for instance, the domestically created value added is calculated as follows:
Yc;D ¼ CDC ba þ LDL bb þ KDK g
 
Yc ð5Þ
Equations 4 and 5 implicitly assume that the total productivity is equal in each region.
To take the regional productivity differences into account, we calculate the productivity-
corrected value added of part c created in region R as follows:
bYc;R ¼ MFPR
CR
C ba þ LRL bb þ KRK g P
MFPR
CR
C ba þ LRL bb þ KRK g  Yc R 2 ðD;E;N ;A;OÞ; ð6Þ
where MFPR is the multi-factor productivity in region R.
Thus, for instance, the domestically created value added is calculated as follows:
bYc;D ¼ MFPD
CD
C ba þ LDL bb þ KDK g P
MFPR
CR
C ba þ LRL bb þ KRK g  Yc R 2 ðD;E;N ;A;OÞ ð7Þ
Operationalization of production factors
If component-level factors and factor shares are unavailable, we use firm-level
information regarding the location of different factors. Firm-level data is based on the
annual reports and websites of each vendor. We have operationalized variables as
follows:
C = Non-current assets or long-lived assets, depending on which was reported in 2007.
L = The number of employees (in 2007).
K = R&D expenditure. We are unable to calculate R&D-stock for each region.
Therefore, we used R&D expenditure for 2007.
In some cases, the reported regional breakdown of some factor is imperfect. In these
cases, we read the entire annual report carefully and researched necessary information
on the Internet to approximate the regional breakdown. For example, National
Semiconductor (US) reports the regional breakdown of long-lived assets (Annual Report,
p. 104) and employees (Annual Report, p. 12), but do not report the exact geographical
breakdown of their R&D expenditure. However, on page 21, the company reports that
their principal research facilities are located in Santa Clara (US) and that they operate
small design facilities in 13 other locations in the United States and 11 locations outside
the US. Out of those 11 overseas R&D units, approximately half are located in Asia and
half in the EU-15 area. Based on these facts, we estimate that approximately 70% of R&D
is done in the U.S. and divide the remaining 30% fifty–fifty between Europe (15%) and
Asia (15%).
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Operationalization of multi-factor productivity (MFP)
We used value added-based MFP figures of the Electrical and Optical equipment and Post
and Telecommunications industries reported by Inklaar and Timmer (2008).11 Using this
database, the regional MFP’s used in our estimations are as follows:
MFPD = 1.24 (Finland)
MFPE = 0.81 (the average of EU-15 countries excluding Finland)
MFPN = 1 (United States)
MFPA = 0.52 (the average of Japan, China, South-Korea and Taiwan). The MFPs of
China, South Korea and Taiwan are based on Motohashi (2007) using Japan as a
reference country (Japan = 1.00).
MFPO = 0.37 (the average of Australia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovenia)
Appendix 2
To test to what extent our results depend on the assumptions we made related to the value
added created by material suppliers’ vendors, we recalculate the geographical breakdown of
value added by changing these assumptions. One could argue that Asia’s role in these
upstream activities is greater than assumed in our basic calculations. Moreover, Australia,
Russia and Africa are important raw material providers, and our basic assumptions
potentially under-estimate the role of these regions in this regard. For these two reasons, we
lower the share of the EU-27 countries to 10% and North America to 10% and raise the
share of Asia to 50% and that of the other countries (including, e.g., Australia, Russia and
Africa) to 30% of the value added created by vendors of vendors. We then re-calculate all
potential combinations related to the final assembly location and the country of final sales.
The results of this re-calculation show that our basic results are valid. On average, 52% of
the total value added is captured in EU-27 countries, 14% in North America, 22% in Asia
and 12% in the rest of the world.
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